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Abstract 
This is an introductory paper seeking to understand how valued resile properties can be incorporated into the super system that is Through-life Engineering 
Services (TES).  It draws on multi-disciplinary Systems Engineering thinking and principles to construct a TES-Landscape comprising 6 generic TES activity 
systems, to bound a TES Capability and to identify potential vulnerabilities therein.  Concepts of risk and resilience are considered in the context of a generic 
TES Capability System (TESS). TESS faces high levels of unpredictable risk and developments to facilitate resilience are desirable. TESS resilience depends on 
shared communication and situational awareness especially during resilience phase 2 (survival during disruption).  To achieve this, prior structures and 
knowledge are essential.  Core system components of TESS are aligned in a Fit-for-Purpose/ Sustainability/ Resilience Matrix, which is developed into an initial 
constructivist TESS Resilience framework (TESSR). The novel approach presented here suggests that resilience in TESS is not a property that can be designed in 
ab initio.  Rather conditions must be created to let it emerge. Future research and developments on how to do this are proposed. 
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1. Introduction 
An animal's survival depends on its ability to gain 
sustainment, protection, recuperation.  Some animals use tools 
to support them in doing this. Human technologies are an 
extension of this, from stone tools to particle accelerators and 
a variety of systems in between.  Our technical systems 
themselves need sustaining, protecting, repairing (especially 
the complex ones).  Self-adaptive versions that could sustain, 
defend and self-repair through operational life, would be 
highly valued – an aim for future autonomous robotic 
maintenance.  Until then, these systems need our support. 
Traditionally, manufacturers make things, and then the in-
service support community maintains them. Systems 
Engineering seeks to optimise and coordinate engineering 
services across the product lifecycle.  The boundaries of these 
activities are changing as new support paradigms such as 
Product-Service Systems (PSS) [1,2,3,4] evolve across 
different economic sectors, offering availability, capability 
and performance-based contracting over traditional spares-
service provision (see [5] for an overview of contract 
categories, p.174).   
For High Value Product (HVP) Systems such as aircraft, 
nuclear submarines and wind farms, PSS contracts could last 
for many years (>30yr), during which time many new and 
unpredictable developments can take place. Anything 
affecting the service offered over that timescale (e.g. 
component failure impacting availability) could incur 
additional risk and cost.  The PSS paradigm therefore 
provides an incentive to extend product life to reduce whole 
life costs (WLC) in an unpredictable environment.  Effective 
feedback mechanisms from in-service data to refine system 
design thus become essential to keep this service efficient. 
This approach blurs the traditional definition of who-does-
what in the value-chain.  To be effective, TES must deliver a 
diverse set of capabilities while simultaneously managing a 
broad range of uncertainties and risks, such as those 
associated with disruptive technologies and business models 
[6], new legislation, unstable supply chains and unpredictable 
futures.  This increases the complexity and challenge in 
comparison to traditional business models.  How can findings 
from resilience research and resilience engineering help TES 
to manage uncertainty and shape their responses to risk?  This 
paper draws together a number of concepts from several 
disciplines to create a framework of factors and the 
interactions between them, which can be used as a guide for 
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evolving increasing resilience in a highly complex system. 
We must first examine the TES domain and a generic TES 
Capability landscape.  A review of resilience-related literature 
can then be evaluated for applicability to TES. 
2. The TES Domain 
Roy [5] describes 7 types of TES: advanced IT, 
autonomous maintenance, cost engineering, degradation and 
obsolescence management, optimised-life, simulation and 
uncertainty modelling.  These are the technology centric 
enablers of a wider capability.  A comprehensive capability 
definition of TES is "…the collaborative provision of a holistic 
customer capability … The system boundary is set to ensure the 
service delivery is most effective and risk is appropriately distributed 
across the delivery network," p199 [7].  This defines a broader 
“System of Interest” (SOI) including: maintenance, design, 
capability, system boundaries and distributed, 'evenly 
allocated' risk [8]. 
2.1. Generic TES Landscape and Context 
Various classes of PSS exist (e.g. product, use or result 
oriented PSS [1, 2]).  Typical PSS  [5] contracts cover 3 areas: 
1) Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul, service and support; 2) 
availability, performance; 3) capability, function and result.  
By adding extended life, new functional requirements and a 
likely need to address disposal, the primary generic TES 
activities for a long-life HVP could include:  
1. Turnaround Servicing (resupply of consumables, visual checks) 
2. Scheduled Maintenance (SM: preventative measures, inspections, 
ABC-Checks) 
3. Unscheduled Maintenance (USM: fault diagnostics & repairs) 
4. Updates (hardware fixes / software patches) 
5. Upgrades (new functional capability) 
6. Disposal (decommissioning support) 
Diverse TES resources are required (e.g. multi-discipline 
expertise, logistics and engineering infrastructure, training, 
commercial, legal, healthcare, and protection of personnel).  
Needs for these resources will vary depending on task (e.g. 
maintenance needs differ from those of upgrade design) and 
on numbers of HPVs supported.  Frequency of activities will 
also vary on a case-by-case basis. 
The stakeholders engaged on the 6 generic activities in this 
landscape will typically include customers, operators, 
manufacturers, primes, suppliers, MROs, contractors, 
regulatory authorities, infrastructure and asset managers, HVP 
owners, financiers, commercial, lawyers, insurers, system 
designers and specialist engineers (human factors and safety 
addressing HVP safety and health hazards), research centres, 
accident investigators, healthcare providers, environment 
specialists.  A critical challenge will be in understanding how 
to bound the TES SOI in a useful way for understanding 
resilience. 
An initial TES Capability context diagram / stakeholder 
map is shown in Fig.1, with representative interaction flows. 
2.2. TES System of Interest (SOI) 
A TES Capability will be built around the specific HVP 
Figure 1: Simple context diagram of a TES Capability, showing some of the 
many key stakeholder blocks (some as composites) and flows (material, 
services & data). Stated Operational Requirement (OR): to sustain an HVP.  
System it supports. The following views consider core 
elements of a generic TES Capability and an HVP System it 
supports, collectively referred to as the TES System (TESS). 
This constitutes the overall SOI that needs to be resilient. 
HVP System  
An HVP (e.g. submarine, wind turbine) is a sophisticated 
system created to support human activity.  Human activity is 
also needed to support the HVP.  Importantly, even largely 
autonomous systems require human activity for preparing (for 
launch), servicing and often retrieving.  HVPs come into 
contact with people in many ways, so technical systems 
always need to consider a human dimension.   
In Fig.2 core HVP components of People, Process, and 
Technology (PPrT) are shown.  The presence of P (e.g. 
operators) within the system means they too will need 
support, in ways that sometimes may not be immediately 
obvious.  Their behaviours may challenge the TES Capability 
designed to support them, creating additional risk (see below). 
TES Capability System 
Like the HVP System, the TES Capability is also a system 
with the core components of PPrT.  Its P (e.g. support 
community) will be a larger set of entities than the P for HVP. 
For simplicity, only some of stakeholders, activities or TES 
technologies (T) are shown here in the TES Capability system 
(Fig.3). Integrated Logistics Support and maintenance 
management systems are implied, as is a “master model” of 
the HVP System's physical and functional architecture (a 
Model Based Systems Engineering artefact) contained within 
the TES Capability and which needs constantly updating as 
usage data matures. This relies on knowledge being generated 
and shared.  This master model will be critical to realise 
effective future capability (updates & upgrades).  The TES 
Capability will also have to deal with threats throughout the 
TESS life, such as future technologies bringing disruptive 
change (e.g. for the HVP System: new materials, self-repair 
electronics, self-awareness; for the TES Capability: 
teleoperated or autonomous robotic repair systems, or 
unexpected business dynamics). 
TESS SOI for Understanding Resilience  
Taken together, the HVP System and TES Capability 
described above form our TESS SOI.  These 'simple' 
perspectives provide a glimpse of the diversity of component 
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 parts interacting across a matrix of levels and complexity. 
The TESS SOI provides a collective view of flow inter-
dependencies and hence sources of vulnerability. The types 
and levels of complexity that characterise a TESS are orders 
 
 
Figure 2: Generic HVP System identifying core system elements (People, Process and Technology).  Example structures (e.g. aircraft wing; nuclear reactor), 
activities (mission) and interactions (control) are shown 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Generic TES Capability system identifying core system elements (PPrT) with representative examples. 
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of magnitude higher than are found for previous business 
models based on narrower SOI and (often) shorter timescales.  
The internal complexity added to environmental 
unpredictability has important implications for resilience. 
3. Risks for the TESS SOI 
ISO 31000 defines risk as an “effect of uncertainty on 
objectives” [9, 10]. Risks can vary in: type, frequency of 
occurrence, severity of impact (both in size and scope); time 
(e.g. when in the day they emerge), lifecycle phase and in 
duration; where and why they occur and how they propagate, 
including whether or not they go unnoticed  (risks must be 
identified if they are to be managed). 
Risk factors affecting the functional ability of a system can 
emerge from within it or from its environment (intrinsic or 
extrinsic).  Risks in the TES Landscape increase over time 
and can be technical (e.g. HVP break-down), commercial 
(e.g. contractual, financial  [11]), or organisational (e.g. 
behavioural) [6]. Fig.4 shows how these can be aligned to the 
PPrT in the TESS SOI.  
Figure 4: PPrT Risk model for the TESS SOI (simplified representation). 
P(e.g. users) affect risk profiles in many ways, including 
by erroneous behaviour (accident) or by intent (sabotage).  
Effects can be subtle too, such as clients taking less care of 
HVPs they do not own, or deactivating monitoring systems 
for privacy, or unpredictable catastrophe (suicide). Value 
creation, value delivery and value capture are another way of 
categorising business risk [6].  The focus on value highlights 
the fact that although the complexity of a TESS SOI 
introduces more vulnerability to risk and uncertainty, it also 
provides wider opportunities for dealing with risk. Capturing 
value in terms of experiential knowledge (and learning 
lessons from it) is essential for managing future risk and for 
enabling resilience. This is an activity that can be distributed 
across the TESS SOI.   
4. Resilience 
Resilience has many forms and it is useful to compare and 
contrast resilience constructs. In materials science it refers to 
a ‘resile’ or spring-back capacity of a compressed material. 
This rebound from perturbation/ disturbance back to 
equilibrium was subsequently associated with ecology and 
systems theory by Holling [12].  Here the focus of resilience 
is on the time needed to recover equilibrium. A conceptual 
relationship between vulnerability (as a system at risk), 
resilience and the ‘capacity of response’ is a property of 
socio-ecological systems. This capacity is applicable to the 
TESS SOI. Here resilience is defined as “state shifts between 
domains of attraction” and vulnerability as structural changes 
in the system and its stability landscape ([13] p301). 
This socio-technical systems perspective views a system 
that retains its functional integrity in the face of extreme but 
predictable conditions as robust. One that does so repeatedly 
is highly reliable.  TESS will need to be robust and highly 
reliable. But not all predictable risks can be controlled 
(because some may be predictable yet so unlikely that no 
action is planned. When such unlikely but predictable risks do 
emerge, outcomes can be fatal (loss of ‘Columbia’ space 
shuttle) or extremely fortunate (safe return of Apollo 13 crew 
following unexpected on-board fire). Resilience in the face of 
such unlikely events and disruptive adversity is also relevant 
to TESS because, in comparison to previous more contained 
business models, it will confront more unlikely risks and 
incalculable probabilities (i.e. it will face uncertainty [11] 
after Knight, 1921).   
A common aim of psychosocial, [14]; socio-ecological 
[15]; socio-technical [16] resilience research is to impart 
restorative capacity (rapid recovery from sudden shock) into 
our thinking, our behaviour and our systems.  This is clearly 
relevant to TESS. But resilience is more than post-event 
recovery; it includes preventing bad things happening and 
from getting worse [17]. Hollnagel [16] defines resilience as 
an:  “intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, 
during or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain 
required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions”   
This definition is operationalised as 3 “phases” in 
Organisational Resilience, which are described as the ability:  
1. “to anticipate risks and future trends (prepare / before)  
2.   to understand the situation, to resist, and act thoughtful 
(response / during)  
3.  to recover fast, to adapt, and to renew or reinvent 
(recover / after)  
while effectively aligning operational with corporate strategies to be 
able to survive in turbulent and complex environments." [19] 
Figure 5:  Phases of organisational resilience in context of TESS: Prepare, 
Survive, Transform and Learn (re-labelled for clarity). 
Resilience terminology comes from different disciplines 
and is inconsistently interpreted.  For example, Phase 1 
requires preparatory anticipation and “avoidance” [21].  In 
Risk Management (RM) terms, avoidance of risk means 
191 Rupert England /  Procedia CIRP  38 ( 2015 )  187 – 196 
controlling it rather than not doing the thing that is risky. 
Phase 2 requires rapid “survival behaviours” which are in 
effect synonymous with crisis management. Phase 3 seeks a 
renewed “recovery” baseline and an ability to “learn”. Some 
sources (such as 18) add learning as a 4th phase. Carpenter et 
al. [20] add mechanisms for 
generating “novelty and 
learning” to adaptive capacity.  
Recovering control in Phase 2 is 
distinct from adapting training in 
Phase 3 “recovery” [21]. The 
operational practices of Business 
Continuity and Enterprise Risk 
Management (BCM & ERM) 
will influence all 3 phases as 
described above [19]. 
Traditional approaches to 
safety use barriers based on our 
understanding of what can go 
wrong (Safety-1). Successive 
models of error and failure have 
evolved complex taxonomies 
spanning front-end P (e.g. 
operator) ‘lapses’ to back-end 
‘latent pathogens’ (deep within 
an organisation) [25]. Accidents 
still happen because our 
knowledge lags behind the 
emergence of new opportunities 
for failure. A focus on failure, 
however, misses the many 
successes (when things go right) 
for which few if any ontologies 
exist.  Resilience is the enabler 
for a different kind of safety: 
Safety-II [26]. TESS can build on 
this by maintaining or creating conditions that may be useful 
in case of future problems, avoiding negative consequences 
and compensating for things that are missing. 
In resilience Phase 1, the concern is primarily with 
managing, controlling, anticipating (known) risks via 
traditional Safety-1 Risk Management.  In Phases 3 (& 4) the 
focus is on readjusting, transforming, learning from survival 
experiences: all critical to sustaining resilient capability. The 
critical and most challenging point for TESS resilience comes 
during Phase 2 (survive), where sustaining operations in the 
context of uncertainty (unknown knowns / 'unknown 
unknowns') must succeed. 
The variations in terminology blur the definitions and 
distinctions between phases. TESS Resilience would be better 
supported by the adoption of some agreed common 
definitions.   
In order to identify common strengths and weaknesses in 
resilience capability an assessment was made of 32 major 
accidents  [21]. The data from this study were collated in 
Fig.6 to provide the combined frequency distribution  
of Jackson’s observed 'Deficiencies'.  The deficiencies score 
highly on resilience ‘attributes’ (as might be expected) but 
clusters around cultural issues, safety and risk management 
emerge too. The highest deficiencies are clearly within the 
People component.  (Jackson remarks that even failures 
attributed to technology are down to a human verification 
failure in the Systems Engineering [21]). 
 
5. Building Resilience in TESS 
A range of components, principles, themes, and 
architectural design heuristics of resilience have thus been 
identified (see also  [17], [18], [21], [22], [23]).  A general 
picture that emerges from these studies indicates that 
Resilience Capability is shaped by system type, origin of 
disruption (intrinsic/ extrinsic), phases of response and 
‘attributes’ such as: 
• Capacity -has the system sufficient margin & resources to absorb 
a disruption? 
• Flexibility -can the system perform its function another way?  
• Tolerance -can the system degrade slowly when subjected to 
disruption? 
• Interrelated Collaboration -do the system elements communicate 
& collaborate? 
Resilience can be positive, as above, or negative, as in the 
persistence of dictatorships, polluted water supplies, and 
underperforming organisations [24; 20]. Negative resilience 
specific to TESS could include a resistance to implementation 
of PSS in the form of a powerful anti-sponsor or internal 
barriers resisting change (Tonelli et al. cited by [6]). 
One way of developing positive resilience in the P 
component is through training. But unknown, unexpected 
Figure 6:  Resilience deficiencies observed in 32 major accidents plotted as polar frequency distribution (based on 
data reported in [21]).  
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risks pose challenges for training.  However, the process of 
training (irrespective of scenario) is itself considered 
important in High Reliability Organisations (HRO). 
Imagining how something might fail (having a 
"preoccupation with failure" [22]) and practicing deciding 
what to do is a Thinking Skill [27], fostering a general 
capability for innovative problem-solving during a crisis. 
In some (e.g. military) situations, any action is better than 
no action, and in times of uncertainty, Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) are considered vital. These may serve as 
handrails to guide thinking during uncertainty and perhaps 
provide a safety net, releasing mental capacity for identifying 
possible new courses of action. But SOPs may not always be 
appropriate and if followed slavishly could also reduce 
flexibility in response as well as prevent a valid solution. 
Helping people to cope with stress, emotions and fatigue 
through resilience training is part of military duty of care. 
People facing crisis need time to think (something shock 
can debilitate) and options for survival.  In regular threat 
situations (Sit I [17]), repeated training to build reflexive 
survival behaviours (such as SOPs and personal resilience) 
can, if appropriate, buy further time to assess the situation. 
Time is critical for risk identification and assessment.  Key 
questions will likely be: what if any options exist, which is 
best, what must be done, what and who might help?  
Following these come feedback-related concerns (e.g. how are 
things progressing? And, possibly later, what can be learned 
from this experience?).  A key factor underpinning the ability 
to ask and answer these questions is Situational Awareness 
(SA). Endsley [29] proposed 3 levels of SA: 
• SA1: Perception (of the elements in the environment): building a 
picture of what is happening 
• SA2: Comprehension (of the current situation): developing 
understanding of events, their cause and consequences; => 
creating mental models 
• SA3: Projection (of future status): formulating simulations and 
scenarios of what might happen in the future and what their 
implications might be; => updating mental models to 
accommodate projected understanding. 
Importantly, SA is acquired through a mental process, not 
provided per se by technology, although the latter can support 
its acquisition. The processes of SA will help influence the 
master model required by the TESS capability system. 
Effective SA and decision-making are vital for resilience (see 
Fig.7) and this can be achieved through the design of tasks  
Figure 7: Survival options linked to Situational Awareness (SA) identifying 
need to support SA levels 1-3 (information sources, understanding 
(individual, shared, joint), projected implications) and multiple lines of 
communication (who can help, who knows something useful the operator 
does not?) 
and technology, information management, organisational 
structures, team cohesion, leadership, communication, 
training, and other supporting infrastructure. Examples 
include providing accurate, relevant, unambiguous, readily 
understood and appropriately managed sources of information 
[30]; agile decision-support aids; and ‘consequence modelling 
agents’ that can recognise and understand operator intent. 
Such features built into a TESS will support operators’ SA 
needs and will help identify options for decisions and actions 
and inform the master model. 
To support a collective response to a crisis, when 
information will be lacking or conflicting, some awareness of 
the situation needs to be held in common. This will be 
supported by an up-to-date, shared, master model, and 
communication that supports the SA processes.  Shared SA 
processes in a TESS, however, depend on boundary-hopping 
(intrinsic-extrinsic) communications.  These are prone to 
various barriers to information sharing, such as friction, 
miscommunication, misunderstanding and breakdowns [28]. 
These can arise between diverse team cultures (e.g. teams 
know how fellow members behave, what understanding they 
share, what vocabulary (jargon) they communicate with, what 
their expectations are).  
Thus a TESS must enable interoperability (i.e. the 
'Interrelated Collaboration' attribute of resilience [21]) via 
common prior knowledge and an effective communication 
infrastructure to support shared SA and timely decision-
making during uncertainty.  Any information system (T) also 
needs to accommodate the Information Logistics requirements 
ensuring rapid assimilation of pertinent information in the 
most suitable format where it is needed [30]. 
Resilience Engineering has drawn on research into High 
Reliability Organisations (HRO), from which several enabling 
themes have been identified [22; 23]: 
• Preoccupation with Failure – what needs to go right; what could 
go wrong; how; what has gone wrong? (Need: to track 'weak 
signals') 
• Reluctance to Simplify (Need: to resist oversimplification) 
• Remain Sensitive to Operations (Need: to become situationally 
aware) 
• Commitment to Resilience (Need: to imagine worse case 
scenarios) 
• Deference to Expertise (Need: migratory decision-making) [22]  
Other themes are: Top-Level Commitment (to resilience), Just 
(Open) Culture, Learning Culture, Awareness, Preparedness, 
Flexibility, Opacity [23]. 
Resilience extends beyond the margin of existing safety 
and for TESS to acquire the resilience of an HRO, it must 
operate in an effective risk, error, and safety management 
controlled manner like HROs. This is unlikely to be 
achievable in the complexity of a TESS (at least not in the 
early days of its establishment), so step one in pursuit of an 
effective resilient capability could be to baseline the TESS, 
compare it to a desired (HRO equivalent) state, and run a 
continuous optimisation strategy to create best practice and 
plug the gaps (this would extend the 'Capacity' attribute of 
resilience). Thus resilience becomes an evolving, emergent 
property of a learning SOI. 
6. A Framework for TESS Resilience: TESSR   
It has been argued that the business model that TES aims 
to support requires a wide and flexible perspective on 
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resilience.  Businesses such as PSS face more uncertainty and 
unpredictable risk than traditional manufacturing or support.  
Much of the flexibility comes from the ability of people to 
create new solutions through a distributed situational 
awareness and problem solving capability.  An analysis of the 
interactions and information flows across the SOI will enable 
the on-going identification of potential vulnerabilities (lack of 
communication, technical function, inappropriate behaviour) 
and potential resilience capability (distributed response 
generation). 
A system’s emergent functionality is a product of its core 
PPrT components and their interactions. Focusing on one 
component alone, such as T, is of itself not enough (and 
reduces the 'Flexibility' attribute of resilience).  HUMS may 
be a key enabler to cost reductions but it is not the only option 
[31] and any solution dependent on HUMS needs to factor in 
the P and Pr components (e.g. data recording can be 
compromised by unanticipated, inappropriate human 
behaviours as well as incomplete or flawed processes).   
Another example of potential interdependency failure is 
the inability to identify or replicate T faults during diagnostics 
and maintenance ('no faults found').  Some of these are a 
result of insufficient training in the use of diagnostic tools so 
they are not used correctly, or at all [32].  Similar disconnects 
arise in the use of new T (e.g. rudder stabilisation systems & 
materials) and how P (e.g. pilot trainers) failed to adapt Pr to 
accommodate them (e.g. train not to overstress structures by 
overly excessive control inputs) [33].  These are all intra- and 
inter-organisational disconnects regarding the use of T which 
TESS must address in its baseline “HRO” configuration.  This 
is something that a unified TES entity or partnership has a 
better chance of doing via standardising internal boundary 
interfaces (e.g. for communications) than allowing multiple 
unaligned independent entities. 
In a crisis, standard responses are no longer appropriate; 
something new is needed but the requirements are often 
unknown and the time frame may be critical.  If we depict 
resilience itself as a 'system' we can further explore its 
enablers and disablers via PPrT.  Which technology (T) 
affords resilience; which process (Pr); which people (P), and 
how?  
With this perspective, resilience in the TESS SOI will 
depend on the inherent resilience of its components (including 
interactions within the components (e.g. between P1 + P2 + Pn 
of say a maintenance team/ crew, or between various 
diagnostic technologies T1 - Tn) plus in the interactions 
between the components.  Interactions with environmental 
elements can also enable resilience, as when external help is  
received during a crisis.  These interactions will be a core 
aspect of our framework for TESS resilience, TESSR.  
Before resilience can be considered, the SOI must be fit for 
purpose and sustainable.  Desired resilience can only be built 
effectively on a system that is suitably fit in the first place.  So 
the framework for TESSR addresses the criteria of Fitness, 
Sustainability and Resilience (FSR) as follows: 
a) Fitness or suitability of the TESS to meet its functional intent: -can 
it deliver PSS, effectively, efficiently and how will this be 
demonstrated?  
b) Sustainability pan-HVP+TC life: -can it continue to deliver 
effectively, efficiently across PSS timeframe; what contingencies 
need to be made?  
c) scope to incorporate principles and attributes of Resilience: -can it 
continue in a changing threat-scape; what are the alternatives?  
Note: A distinction is made here between sustainability and 
resilience (although some [e.g. 19] identify synergies between 
these properties). In considering sustainable system design, 
Fiksel [34] identifies 4 enabling factors for resilience: 
• Diversity:   existence of multiple forms & behaviours 
• Efficiency:  performance with modest resource consumption 
• Adaptability:  flexibility to change in response to new pressures 
• Cohesion:  existence of unifying forces or linkages ] 
Table 1 aligns TESS core components of PPrT and 
interaction linkages between them with the FSR criteria to 
create a matrix of sample questions to investigate.  Using this 
as a framework for evaluating resilience, it can be applied to a 
given activity (e.g. a holistic TESS meeting all activities, or a 
specific TES Capability activity such as fault diagnostics 
(Fig.8). The first 2 criteria of the FSR matrix should be 
successfully addressed before the third can be fully 
considered. However, when resilience has been investigated, 
it will allow further requirements capture to be derived for the 
first 2 criteria, on the basis of sustaining resilience and 
including resilience as a “purpose”. 
Table 2 provides an example of the factors that should be 
reviewed when investigating the Resilience questions 
presented in Table 1.  It shows prominent attributes for 
resilience collated from the literature.  Consideration of these 
attributes will provide a broad perspective of resilience 
enablers and disablers (the list of attributes is representative 
and can be developed further).  This resilience analysis must 
continue throughout the life of the TESS in order to adapt to 
change and new knowledge.  Table 2 is the blank template for 
doing this.  As is the nature of resilience, this constructivist 
framework is intended to be adaptive and flexible so that 
experience in using it will improve its application through 
knowledge capture and learning. 
While it is understood that resilience affords a vital 
capability in terms of survival opportunity, it is not something 
that can be built in to a system ab initio. Some things that, 
disable resilience can, however, be controlled. Similarly, 
provision can be made to encourage the things that enable it. 
Figure 8: Simplified TESS maintenance scenario showing PPrT components 
and interaction linkages  
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Table 1: FSR Matrix: ‘PPrT Components & Linkages’ x ‘Fit-for-purpose / Sustainability / Resilience’ stages  
TESS 
  
Fit for Purpose  Sustainable Resilience (R) 
P 
(P within TESS 
could be OEM 
primes & non 
OEM partners; 
non TESS P could 
also impact TESS 
e.g. terrorism) 
Who is part of the TESS 
(TESS OEM/ Prime versus 
potential partners)? Who else 
needs to be? Can they be?  
Can P deliver effectively/ 
efficiently? When, where, how 
are P doing what is required? 
Are they impeded, how (i.e. 
do they understand and know 
how to use T)?  Which P 
supports whom & how? 
How does P affect T and Pr? 
Is P sustainable through-life?  
How will it be kept so; what 
contingencies are possible? Are P 
capabilities sustainable?  
Examples: are career paths 
enduring; impact of retirement, will 
exposure to low frequency tasks 
result in skill fade? Will changes 
to working practices, create more 
opportunity for error?  Who else 
should be involved to improve 
sustain-ability, when, where & 
how? 
What / how / when / where can P 
support R?  What alternatives are 
possible?  Where can flexibility be 
acquired? TESS culture, attitudes, 
leadership, behaviour support R? 
Example: Having spare resource 
capacity (slack, safety buffer) 
adds flexibility to cope with 
periods of high demand but adds 
o cost during lows. Can costs be 
balanced to support R? 
Pr 
(Pr includes a 
wide range e.g. 
integrated product 
or service 
development, 
Training, Safety 
Management, 
SOPs, etc.) 
Which processes are 
included, and which need to 
be?  How are they 
implemented, monitored, 
governed for compliance?  
Are they effective?  Have they 
been verified safe and 
validated?  Do different 
partner Pr conflict? 
How does Pr affect P and T? 
Are the processes robust? How 
will they be updated, IKM 
maintained, and lessons 
learned? How will Pr keep pace 
with change? Are sustainable 
process improvements planned? 
Example: What strategies for 
deploying new Pr, T or P are in 
place to ensure existing needs 
continue to be met when 
updates issued. 
Can Pr support R? Should some 
Pr be avoided (excessive 
constraint) or  if not present, 
compensated for? What 
alternative Pr options exist?  Can 
Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) be developed to support 
crisis management?  Should Pr 
define unifying practices across 
diverse TESS cultures? How? 
T 
(T includes 
hardware, 
software & 
information / 
knowledge 
management 
systems) 
What T are present or need to 
be to support HAS? Does the 
T do what is needed and does 
it do so for long enough?  Is 
what T provides usable? What 
T is required to provide 
support?  What T monitors or 
helps govern?  What T 
watches the watching T? How 
does T affect P and Pr? 
 
Is current T sustainable through-
life?  How will it be kept so; what 
contingencies possible? Are 
capabilities sustainable: different 
component life profiles, issues 
for obsolescence?  What else 
should be included to extend 
sustainability?  
Can the T support R? How can it 
better support P or Pr?  What 
alternatives exist? Would plasticity 
(re-configurable T) help? Can 
extra redundancy support R cost-
effectively through life?  
Examples: Having an optional 2nd 
gearbox for wind -turbines in non-
serviceable (extreme) weather 
conditions; standardising parts 
may reduce costs but also 
diminish diversity for R. 
P - T Are all the links required for 
TESS present and are they 
working as expected? 
Are the linkages sustainable 
through long life?  If vulnerable 
how can they be protected? 
Which links support R? What links 
should be avoided or might be 
missing / should be added?  Do 
they conflict with extant links?  
What alternatives exist? 
T - Pr 
Pr - T 
Table 2:  Template for a TESSR Matrix derived from resilience questions in the FSR Matrix Table 1. Attributes of resilience (derived from 
literature: [20; 21; 34; 35]) Key for Interaction Linkages: 1=P-T; 2=T-P; 3=T-Pr; 4=Pr-T; 5=Pr-P; 6=P-Pr 
 
Resilience Attributes Components Linkages 
 P Pr T 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Adaptability flexibility to change in response to new pressures [34]          
Capacity has system sufficient margin & resources to absorb a disruption? [21]          
Cohesion existence of unifying forces or linkages [34]          
Diversity existence of multiple forms & behaviours [34]          
Efficiency performance with modest resource consumption [34]          
Flexibility can the system perform its function another way? [21]          
Interrelated Collaboration do system elements communicate & collaborate? [21]          
Latitude maximum amount of change system can absorb and still function [35]          
Learning capacity [20]          
Novelty capacity [20]          
Panarchy degree to which a given hierarchical level is influenced by others [35]          
Precariousness how close to the limit or threshold the system currently is [35]          
Resistance capacity of system to maintain its state in the face of disruptions [35]          
Tolerance can system degrade slowly when subjected to disruption? [21]          
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Over time, more disablers and enablers will be identified, if 
the TESS is ‘sensitized’ to perceive, comprehend and project 
the situational factors in a collective way across the whole 
SOI. On this basis, the ability to visualise the disablers and 
enablers of resilience is of value and it is hoped the proposed 
TESSR ‘framework’ can be utilised for this very purpose.   
Superficially, facilitating resilience would incur a cost 
burden, eroding margins and efforts to bring down WLC in 
PSS. But enabling resilience becomes increasingly more 
attractive when factored over the contracted PSS term and 
balanced against penalties for non-delivery of (especially 
safety or critical) PSS provision. Hopefully, TESSR can 
promote a more healthy tension between cost-effective TES 
Capability and a resilient TESS. 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
In exploring Strategic Resilience for TES, we have 
considered a potential TES landscape of support activities (i.e. 
Turnaround to Disposal). A number of illustrative views were 
created for an HVP System, a TES Capability and an initial 
overarching TESS.  The nature of risk, from simple to 
complex, was considered along with its possible management 
(avoid, control, etc.) in relation to PPrT. Concepts of 
resilience from different disciplines and HROs, component 
phases and attributes were introduced.  Key conclusions were 
that TESS faces complexity, uncertainty and the need to cope 
with unlikely risks; that the internal complexity of a TESS can 
offer increased resilience as well as greater vulnerability to 
risks, particularly through supporting the P component 
through T and Pr; that the ability to survive during a crisis 
depends on a prepared resilience capacity including the ability 
to learn; and that resilience has to evolve over time. An initial 
‘Fit-for-purpose / Sustainability / Resilience’ FSR Matrix for 
TESS was proposed, accommodating PPrT components and 
linkages (Table 1).  This was used to develop a template for a 
TESSR Matrix (Table 2).  TESSR delves deeper into the 'R' 
questions of the FSR Matrix through the use of representative 
attributes derived from literature. TESSR is intended to assist 
in the identification of resilience disablers and locations 
where resilience might be facilitated.  It is also for use as an 
embedded tool supporting the development and maintenance 
of a human-centric capability for situational awareness and 
learning that will evolve increasing resilience over the 
lifetime of a TESS. 
The approach suggested here would require management 
processes to specifically incorporate on-going resilience 
capability development throughout the lifecycle.  The 
framework provides an indication of the necessarily wide 
scope of this activity.  This paper has argued for the 
importance of achieving resilience in the TES business model, 
and therefore the cost-effectiveness of taking this approach to 
resilience. 
Next steps are to apply the FSR and TESSR matrices in a 
representative TESS. It is suggested that it should be used to 
drive technology requirements to demonstrate the broader 
range of resilience properties that can be derived from an 
integrated approach. This will allow validation through proofs 
of concept and the basis for a real-time, lifetime support for 
TESSR. Successive iterations to refine generic constructs for 
specific TESS SOIs (e.g. to explore autonomous maintenance 
for in-orbit satellite or undersea repair) and of extending 
TESSR as a design support tool for tactical resilience are being 
considered.  Other opportunities include developing potential 
Fitness-for-Purpose (TESSF) or Sustainability (TESSS) 
frameworks. As this research indicates that resilience 
solutions need to grow and self-regulate, this does not allow 
for predictive modelling or deterministic analysis.  Validation 
will rely on in vivo evaluation.   This is in some respects and 
important limitation, but should not prevent the attempt to 
navigate the complexity of this important area. 
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